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Automatic and remotely controlled main line valves are used in natural gas transmission pipelines to provide early shutoff of gas flow in the event of a pipeline rupture. Operating experience, however, shows that these valves and their associated rupture detection and valve operator systems are not always reliable in sensing a line break and in achieving valve closure. There are documented instances o f pipeline ruptures going undetected, and of main line valves not closing completely after even a full line break. False valve closures have also occurred, causing pipelines to be shut down unnecessarily.
Under sponsorship o f the Gas Research Institute (GRI), a technology assessment program was conducted by Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) to define the present state of the art o f automatic and remotely controlled main line valves, to evaluate their effectiveness in achieving isolation of a ruptured line, and to identify technology improvements that are needed to improve valve reliability. This study was based on a survey of the U.S. natural gas industry's experience with line break control equipment, and upon computational modeling of typical pipeline systems to simulate the generation and propagation of pressure and flow transients created by a line break. Line break transients were also compared to the transient levels generated by normal pipeline operations (start-up and shutdown of compressors, branch load changes, etc.).
Also during this study, a semi-empirical computer model was developed to calculate pipeline blowdown time as a function of break size, pipeline configuration, and operating conditions, even in cases where valve closure is delayed for some period after the line break occurs. This information can be o f value to pipeline engineers and emergency response planners.
Results of the technology assessment show that the primary source of unreliability in present day line break control systems lies in their inability to discriminate between a line break transient, and those generated by other pipeline operations. In most cases, automatic control valves (ACV's) sense the rate of pipeline pressure drop (ROPD) to detect a line break. In many field applications, however, transient pressure signals caused by compressor operations and load changes are stronger than those produced by a line break. In order to avoid false valve closures which could otherwise result, sensitivity of the rupture detection systems is "backed off," often to the point of inoperability of the ACV.
Other fluid transient signals besides pressure drop are also generated in the pipeline during a line break, and these can sometimes be used advantageously to replace or confirm the traditional ROPD signal. In looped parallel pipelines, for example, crossover flow rate is usually a more reliable line break signal when crossovers are open. The resultant line-to-line differential pressure also provides a viable option when crossovers are either open or closed.
In general, however, no one detection parameter is optimum for all applications. Of even more importance is the rupture sensor location. The concept of locating additional sensors between the main line valves (rather than ju st at the valves) provides the most promising approach for enhancing the reliability of present ACV's and for providing needed line break information to remote controlled valves (RCV's). In either case (ACV's or RCV's), rupture sensor location is much more important than valve location or valve spacing in ensuring reliable rupture isolation. However, valve spacing does affect the volume o f gas blown down after shut-in of a ruptured section. This time can often be from 10 to 60 minutes for typical pipeline valve spacings.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In response to industry's need to improve the reliability o f ACV's and RCV's, the program described herein was initiated by GRI to assess the present state of the art of automatic and remote controlled valves, and to define where, and under what circumstances such equipment can be relied upon to successfully isolate a ruptured pipeline section. Specific objectives of this technology assessment were as follows:
• To clarify the uses and limitations of automatic and remotely controlled valves to quickly isolate pipelines in emergencies.
• To review the current state of the art in this technology.
• To determine locations and situations where such devices would be reliable and beneficial. In this assessment, 23 major gas transmission pipeline companies and 11 equipment manufacturers and service providers were interviewed. In addition, reviews were made of Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) accident reports for the gas pipeline industry and of the open technical literature relating to pipeline ruptures and detection/control technology.
In addition, computer simulations of several typical pipeline configurations were performed to define pressure and flow transient generation and propagation in both single line and multiple (looped) line systems when a line break occurs. These simulation results were compared to simulation results in which transients were generated by normal pipeline operations, e.g., compressor operations, load variations, valving changes, etc. The technology assessment was completed in April of 1995 and a final report was issued in the third quarter of 1995.^^-This paper discusses results from that report.
AUTOMATIC CONTROL VALVES
Automatic control valves used by the natural gas industry normally consist of a main line valve, a detector system to identify the rupture event, and a power gas or gas/hydraulic operator that physically closes and reopens the valve. Use of these devices dates back to the 1940's, and early models used pneumatic sensors located at the valve to sense the rate of pressure drop in a pipeline. Pneumatic logic was provided so that whenever the ROPD exceeded a pre-set threshold value, the detector system triggered a pneumatic "power gas" control system to close the main line valve. Figure 1 is a schematic o f an early version o f the ACV's used extensively in the 1960's and '70's. The main components o f the sensing system are a reference pressure tank connected to the pipeline and a restrictor orifice in the line between the tank and the pipeline. The tank is normally charged to pipeline pressure. If pipeline pressure falls faster than the reference tank pressure can bleed down, th a t die differential pressure between the pipeline and the tank triggers a pilot valve to close the main line valve. This basic design is still in use today, although a separate power gas tank with sufficient capacity may be added in some cases (shown as dotted lines on Fig. 1 ) to ensure full valve closure even if pipeline pressure falls very quickly.
Early electronic versions o f the ROPD system (1970's) incorporated electronic reference transducers to replace the orifice-reference tank detector system. These usually were installed in conjunction with the traditional power-gas valve closure systems. Reliability was a problem with these early electronic systems, primarily because of drift in the 1970 vintage analog electronics. Today, the electronic-based devices have been developed using improved transducers and more stable and reliable digital data acquisition and processing. These newer units are currently under test by several pipeline companies.
Field experience within the gas industry has identified several functional problems with automatic control valves that sometimes make them unreliable in achieving isolation of a rupture pipeline section. These include:
• Unreliability in detecting line breaks.
• Failure to achieve full valve closure when a break is detected. • Susceptibility to false closures, triggered by normal operational transients within the pipeline.
Both pneumatic and electronic ROPD detectoricontrol systems appear to be well engineered, and if properly adjusted and maintained, can reliably detect a line break when the ROPD signals exceed a preset value. While dirt and icing problems sometimes occur in the pneumatic detector systems, the primary shortcoming of all ROPD detectors lies in the fact that ROPD is not a reliable indicator of a line break for many pipeline applications. Other pipeline transients that occur in normal pipeline operation can have ROPD characteristics similar to a line break. Therefore, other pipeline transients can mask the rupture signals or can cause false indications of a pipeline rupture. If sensitivity is reduced to avoid false closures, the detector may miss a full line ruptures as well.
In addition, proper adjustment o f the pneumatic detector sensitivity is difficult and inexact The rate of pressure decay in the reference pressure tank (Fig. 1) is dependent upon the size o f the orifice, pipeline static pressure, and the rate of change of line pressure. Since line pressure decay rate (ROPD) from a line break is a function of break size, location, and line length, the only practical means of defining orifice size is by trial and error; i.e., to find the smallest size that will not produce false closures. Again, that approach may mean that sensitivity has been reduced to the point that even full line breaks can be missed. It is not uncommon for transient pressures generated by a nearby compressor station to be stronger than those produced by a line break IS miles or so down the pipeline. The only practical way to evaluate whether ROPD is a usable signal for a given application (and to define the required detector sensitivity) is by computer simulation, whereby the relative magnitudes of a line break transient and those produced by other operational sources can be defined.
REMOTE CONTROL VALVES
Because o f their unreliability, ACV's have been abandoned by several operating companies, and others have more recently sought alternative means of detecting and amtrolling a line break. This usual approach centers on the use of remote control valves (RCV's), which are opened or closed from a remote location such as Gas Control. Closure o f die valve is determined by the control system and/or human intervention using telemetered pressure and flow data from the pipeline. As shown in Fig. 2 , RCV's have the same functional components as an ACV, plus a communication channel between the valve site and the Gas Control Center. They differ from ACV's in that the decision to close or open the valve is usually made by human judgment rather than by a detector/logic system at die valve site. Multiple data points and human judgment are intended to enhance the reliability of detecting a line break and to minimi?? the chance of false valve closures. In some cases, computer simulation models are used to enhance the reliability of interpreting SCADA data far rupture and leak detection.
RCV's can also suffer from some o f the same reliability problems as ACV's and especially those 
pressure decay d ata and, as such, experience the same d ifficu lty in discrim inating betw een a line break and norm al operating transients. The hoped-for advantage o f R C V 's is few e r v alv e clo su res due to false rupture d e te c tio n . T h is re su lts p rim arily from th e hum an judgm ent req u ired to actuate the valve, and d ata from several locations (e.g., upstream and dow nstream o f the break, in o th e r looped pipelines, etc.). Even w ith the additional d ata channels, however, it can still be difficult to d istinguish betw een a line break and other transient signals produced in the pipeline. The chances o f false rupture detection and incom plete valve closure still e x is t
P IP E L IN E S IM U L A T IO N . S T U D IE S
In o rd er to analytically investigate the tim e-varying internal flow and pressure phenom ena associated w ith the rupture an d blow dow n o f a pipeline, a com puter model was developed based on the um ethod-of-characteristics." This m odel can sim ulate the steady o r tim e-varying flow rate in e ith e r single or m ultiple (looped) pipelines that results from (1) start-up o r shutdown o f com pressors both upstream and dow nstream o f the b re a k (2) opening and closing o f m ain line valves, (3) branch flow s in o r out o f the pipeline a t points along its length, and (4) blowdown o f the lin e section. In addition, a sim ple com putational routine program m ed to run on a PC -based spreadsheet form at w as developed to calculate blowdown tim e for a ruptured pipe segm ent T he o b jec tiv e s o f sim ulation studies using these models were:
(1) D ocum ent the signal-to-noise environm ent for traditional sensor system s located at m ain line valves and other locations along the pipeline, and for various line break sizes and locations. (2) E v a lu a te th e e ffe c tiv en e ss o f a lte rn a tiv e detection techniques. (3) P redict blowdown tim e follow ing a line break assum ing imm ediate o r delayed valve closure. (4) In v estig ate th e su itab ility o f th e sim ulation program s as system design and analysis tools.
T E S T S A N D S IM U L A T IO N R E S U L T S
In itia l sim u latio n s concentrated on a sin g le lin e pipeline betw een tw o com pressor stations, to docum ent and com pare the relative strengths o f line break transients w ith th o se g e n e ra te d by com pressor sta rt-u p s and shutdow ns, and by branch loads. D ata w ere plo tted to show the rate o f pressure changes as seen a t points along the lines as a function o f break size, break location, and the ram p-up and ram p-dow n tim e o f com pressors and branch loads. Selected data from these studies are shown in Figs. 3 through 7 . Figure 3 shows com puted pressure gradients along a single 30-inch 800 p si pipeline before and after a line break. N otice th at at the break site, lin e pressure drops very rapidly. A fter cute m inute, line pressure is less than 100 psig. I f an ACV o r RCV is located nearby, and its operator is pow ered directly from line pressure, pressure at t i e valve m ay be insufficient to achieve fu ll valve closure, especially as differen tial pressure builds up across the valve as it is closed. Figure 4 shows the m agnitude o f an ROPD signal as it would appear along the pipeline for several break sizes located a t the center o f th e lin e m ilepost (M P 22.5), and compares these to "background noise level," defined as an upstream co m p resso r shutdow n and a dow nstream com pressor start-up. These plots show th at even a full line break a t the m idpoint betw een com pressor stations cannot be reliab ly sensed n ear the com pressor stations because o f high com pressor noise (ROPD) levels. (1) F or a break near V -l, the detector at V-2 must have a sensitivity as shown by vector B. (2) F or a break near V -3, the detector at V-2 must have a sensitivity as shown by vector C. (3) T he d etecto r se n sitiv ity a t valve V -2 m ust th e re fo re be se le c te d as v e c to r C, to accom m odate th e low er o f the tw o rupture signals. U sing sim ilar logic, we can define the required detector sensitivities a t each o f the valve locations:
• A t V -l, the required sensitivity is vector A • A t V-3, the required sensitivity is vector E • A t V-4, the required sensitivity is vector F Figure 6 is sim ilar to F ig . S, except th at com pressor noise is included in the p l o t I t is clear from this figure that the required sensitivity settings for valves V-2 and V-3 (show n by vectors C and E , respectively) are alm ost dow n in to th e co m p resso r n o ise , and a re p o ten tial candidates fo r false rupture detection. By sim ilar logic, it is seen th at the required detector sensitivity a t valves V -l and V-4 are w ell below the noise level. T he detection threshold a t these locations m ust be increased to at least A ' and F to avoid false closure, b u t in so doing, the contiguous line sections w ill be left largely unprotected. Figure 7 adds an additional noise source; i.e., a branch w ithdraw al transient (30% o f m ain line flow ) located at M P 22.5.
It is clear from these sim ulations that valves V-2 and V-3 can be adjusted to p r o te a their adjacent line sections w ithout false closures, although the signal-to-noise ratio is m arginal. A t locations V-1 and V-4, how ever, the background lev e l is h igher than the required detector threshold, and false closures w ill re s u lt T hese sin g le lin e sim u latio n s show th a t ACV reliability problem s can resu lt w hen operating transients in die pipeline produce stronger ROPD signals than does a full line break. U sing these data, and sim ilar data from sim ulation studies o f looped parallel pipelines, application guidelines w ere developed fo r th e use o f both ACV's and RCV's, and these guidelines describe the procedures for a quantitative protective system d e sig n .^^* U C O N C L U S I O N S M ajor conclusions from the technology assessm ent program are as follow s:
(1) T he p rim ary relia b ility problem s associated w ith A C V 's lie in th e ir in ab ility , in som e c a se s, to d isc rim in a te betw een lin e break signals and those generated by norm al pipeline o p e ra tio n s. W hen o p erating transients are com parable in m agnitude to those o f a line break, false rupture detection and subsequent valve closures can occur, and these interrupt p ip elin e flow and can cause curtailm ent o f custom er serv ices. In those cases, i f ACV d etector sensitivity is decreased to avoid false ru p tu re d e te c tio n , th e ACV m ay also be insensitive to a fu ll lin e break unless the break appears very near the valve. (2) In reliab ly achieving early valve closure and p ipeline shutdow n a fte r a line break, detector location is m uch m ore im portant than valve location o r spacing. In th e exam ple scenario d e p icted in F igs. 5 and 6, i f detectors are appropriately located betw een valves V-1 and V-2, fo r exam ple, and detector data are used to trigger the valve operators, then a lin e break anyw here betw een th e tw o valves can be su c ce ssfu lly iso la te d . V alve lo catio n o r spacing, in th at case, w ould only affect how long it takes the line section to blow down. F inal selectio n and lo catio n o f a sensor is strongly dependent upon site specific pipeline configurations and operating conditions. No one param eter is optim um for all applications, and m u ltip le d e te c to rs betw een m ain lin e valves is n o t always necessary. (6) C om puter sim u la tio n m odels p ro v id e an effectiv e m eans o f designing o r analyzing eith er autom atic o r rem ote valve protective system s fo r c ritic a l ap p licatio n s, and fo r defining th e req u ired detector sensitivity for each specific application.
Im proved reliab ility o f the rupture detection sy stem can reduce the ris k o f false valve closure and reduce the total blow dow n tim e. H ow ever, valve closure w ill n o t m itigate the in itia l ru p tu re event, and w ill rarely affe c t ignition o f the escaping gas. M ost property dam age and personal injuries, therefore, w ill likely be unaffected by early valve closure. (8) The com puter sim ulation techniques developed fo r this program allow an extensive evaluation o f p ro te c tiv e system d esign and analysis o p tio n s fo r p ip elin e designers and safety engineers. In all cases, however, both the use of, and design of, line break control equipm ent sh o u ld be done iq c o n ju n c tio n w ith a c o m p reh en siv e ris k m anagem ent stra te g y developed by the pipeline company.
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